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Abstract
Regulatory change not seen since the Great Depression swept the U.S. bank-
ing industry beginning in the early 1980s, culminating with the Interstate Banking
and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994. Significant consolidations have occurred in
the banking industry. This paper considers the correlation, if any, between bank-
ing concentration on a state-by-state basis and average bank profitability within a
state, finding strong support for a positive correlation. Moreover, temporal causal-
ity tests imply that bank concentration leads bank profitability. Our finding sug-
gests that bank regulators need to monitor the consolidation process to head off
the accumulation of monopoly power.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification: E5, G2
Keywords: commercial banks concentration, profitability
  2
1. Introduction 
 
The twentieth century witnessed two periods of dramatic regulatory and structural change in the 
U.S. banking industry – the Great Depression and the 1980s and 1990s. While many important 
regulations were enacted during the Great Depression, the 1980s and 1990s experienced the 
repeal and/or reversal of most depression-era financial regulations. Moreover, the last two 
decades also saw the transformation of the banking industry from one with much geographic 
limitation on banking and branching to one that now allows interstate banking and branching. 
 The 1980s and early 1990s also experienced severe financial turbulence – the savings and 
loan debacle followed by the crisis in the commercial banking industry. Those crises led to 
failure rates among financial institutions not seen since the Great Depression. Furthermore, those 
financial problems triggered many of the regulatory changes that occurred in the 1980s and 
1990s. Conventional wisdom suggests that the emergence of interstate banking and branching 
generated a significant increase in mergers and acquisitions (Rhoades 2000, and Jeon and Miller 
2002b). One view of the consolidation process in the banking industry suggests that it is by and 
large a positive event  -- banks became more efficient (Jayaratne and Strahan, 1997, 1998). 
Another view sees a possible negative effect of consolidation on the availability of loans to small 
businesses (Ely and Robinson, 2001). 
 Our paper examines a part of the old structure, conduct, and performance triad in 
industrial organization. More specifically, we consider the correlation, if any, between bank 
consolidation and bank performance. In other words, are more concentrated markets more 
profitable? We find that bank profitability does correlate positively with bank concentration 
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within a state, even after adjusting for the economic environment within that state. In addition, 
temporal causality tests imply that bank concentration leads (causes) bank profitability. 
 The next section discusses recent events in the U.S. banking industry, emphasizing 
changes in market concentration and bank performance Section 3 provides background 
information concerning our tests of bank concentration and performance – that is, market 
definition, concentration measures, and profit-structure relationships. Section 4 describes the 
data, proposes the hypothesis tests, and reports the results. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Market Concentration and Bank Performance 
The history of banking in the United States provides important background information for 
understanding how we got to where we are today. The founding fathers were concerned about 
concentrations of power – political and/or economic. That predisposition helps to explain the 
various facets of regulation that speak to the operation of branch banks. Initially, banks were 
chartered within states and were prohibited from operating across state lines. When the National 
Banking Act of 1863 established the possibility of a federal charter, those newly established 
banks with federal charters were also prohibited from operating across state boundaries. Only in 
the mid-1980s did the dikes holding back the waters of a true interstate banking system began to 
crumble. The Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 opened the sluice gates 
to full interstate banking, a process that is still working itself out. 
 In recent papers, Rhoades (2000) and Jeon and Miller (2002b) outline the effects of U.S. 
commercial bank merger activity on banking structure. Several points deserve mention. First, the 
merger activity that began in the early 1980s continued through the late 1990s. Of course, the 
sustained merger activity was first precipitated by the pressure within the banking industry to 
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consolidate and then aided and abetted by the regulatory reform, culminating with the Interstate 
Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994.1 
 Second, Rhoades (2000) argues that concentration in bank deposits among the top-25 and 
top-100 organizations rose between 1980 and 1998.2 Surprisingly, Rhoades (2000) also reports 
that concentration, measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman index and the percent of deposits 
held by the top-3 bank organizations, at the local level (MSAs and non-MSAs) hardly changed 
over the sample period. Jeon and Miller (2002b) report that concentration in bank assets among 
the top-5, top-10, top-20, top-50, and top-100 banks, not organizations, exhibited a U-shaped 
pattern, falling in the 1980s and rising through the 1990s. That finding is consistent with 
Rhoades’s (2000) observation that the 1990s ushered in more large-bank merger activity. Jeon 
and Miller (2002b) then consider the top-5 and top-10 bank concentration ratios (percent of 
assets held by 5 and 10 largest banks, not organizations) on a state-by-state basis. The average 
concentration across states increased almost monotonically from 1976 to 1998. The top-5 ratio 
rose from 45.2 in 1976 to 61.6 in 1998 while the top10 ratio rose from 55.4 to 70.8.3 
 Third, Rhoades (2000) notes that the bank profit rate rose throughout the 1990s. He 
attributes that observation to an improving economy, stating that the increased profits “almost 
certainly reflect, to a large degree, this extraordinary performance of the U.S. economy and have 
 
1 Stiroh and Poole (2000) ask whether the rising concentration of bank assets in the 1990s reflects expansion of 
exiting organizations or mergers with other organizations. They conclude that the bulk of the expansion reflects 
merger activity. 
2 The variable bank organizations treats a bank holding company as one entity, aggregating the balance sheets and 
income statements of all banks within the holding company to one grand balance sheet and income statement. Jeon 
and Miller (2002b) treat each bank within a holding company as a separate entity. 
3 Jeon and Miller (2002b) no longer report that information in their forthcoming paper, but will make it available to 
interested readers. 
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probably been contributing factors to the bank merger movement.” (p. 30). That is, Rhoades 
(2000) argues that higher profits led to more mergers. An alternative explanation suggests that 
merger activity led to increasing concentration and that increased market concentration led to 
increased profits.4 We test those hypotheses in the next section using state-level, time-series data. 
3. Market Definition, Concentration Measures, and Profit-Structure Relationships 
This section discusses three different, but related, issues that prove important in our econometric 
tests. To develop a concentration measure, we need to determine the geographic spread of the 
relevant market. Moreover, several different hypotheses exist to explain the direct profit-
structure linkage. 
Market Definition 
The link, if any, between market concentration and bank performance received considerable 
attention, especially during the 1980s immediately after a significant number of deregulatory 
changes in the banking industry. The conventional wisdom then, and now, argues that policy 
makers should consider whether bank consolidation leads to excessive market power in retail, 
rather than wholesale, markets. That is, wholesale markets reflect national, if not global, reach; 
whereas retail markets reflect relatively small geographic areas -- metropolitan statistical areas 
(MSAs) or counties. Consequently, prior tests of bank consolidation on bank performance used 
MSA and/or non-MSA county data. Researchers and policy makers generally adopt geographic 
regions smaller than the state as the “relevant market” for analyzing whether a new charter 
makes sense in a specific region. 
 
4 In the same section, Rhoades (2000) also noted that “the number of bank mergers reached peak levels during the 
mid-1980s, at which time industry profit rates … were quite low. This finding is somewhat surprising because high 
… profits are widely believed to be conducive to merger activity.” (p. 31). Our alternative explanation fits nicely 
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 Radecki (1998) argues, however, that events may require a rethinking of that long-held 
view. To wit, two decades of deregulation of geographic restrictions on banking and branching 
operations may now make the state the geographic level at which policy makers and researchers 
should address the concentration and performance issues. Radecki (1998) employs a number of 
observations to bolster his case. First, researchers find that large banks within a state now post 
uniform prices for bank services across the whole state and do not post different prices for 
different geographic regions within a given state. Second, smaller community banks must 
compete with the larger banks, even though they may only operate within one of the states 
traditional geographic regions. That is, competition with large banks equalizes the pricing of 
bank services across the entire state, even though small community banks may not operate in the 
whole state. Third, and interestingly, large banks that operate in several states still post different 
prices for bank services in different states, although they post uniform prices within a given 
state. 
 In sum, deregulation of geographic restrictions on banking and branching operations now 
may make it more sensible to examine the linkages between bank concentration and bank 
performance on a state-by-state analysis, rather than an MSA and non-MSA county analysis. 
Concentration Measures 
Since we adopt the state level as the “relevant market,” we calculate our measures of 
concentration at that level. We employ three measures of bank concentration – the percent of 
assets held by the five largest and ten largest banks in a state as well as the Herfindahl-
 
with this observation. Merger activity preceded the improvement in profits. 
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Hirschman index, which equals the sum of the squared of the percent of total assets held by each 
(and every) bank.5 
 The passage of the Reigle-Neil Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 
eliminated the last vestiges of geographic restrictions on banking and branching operations in the 
U.S. It also created a methodological issue for our measures of concentration. Before the Reigle-
Neil Act, the balance sheet and income statement information on a bank’s operation within a 
given state was reported by that bank within that state, even if that bank belonged to a multibank 
holding company headquartered in another state. Now, however, interstate consolidations of 
bank operations can, but does not always, occur. When that consolidation happens, the balance 
sheet and income statement information for a given bank in a given state incorporates the 
information from other banks that it owns in other states. The Act permitted such consolidations 
after July 1, 1997, but allowed states to enact the provision earlier, if they so chose. And about 
half of the states did so (Sprong 2000, pp. 177-78). NationsBank provides the extreme example 
of such consolidations, growing from $31 billion in assets in 1994 to $79 billion in 1995 (Stiroh 
and Strahan 2002), after consolidating many banks from other states into its North Carolina 
operations. As a result, the measures of concentration rise in North Carolina, even though 
nothing real changed, and the concentration measures in the other involved states probably rises 
as well, unless the acquired bank in the other state was a large bank in which case the 
concentration measure could fall. Thus, as a theoretical proposition, our measures of 
 
5 As argued in the section on profit-structure relationships, the top-5 and top-10 measures capture the idea of 
relative market power whereas the Herfindahl-Hirschman index captures the idea of structure-conduct-performance. 
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concentration provide biased measures after 1994, suggesting that we may want to end our 
analysis with 1994.6 
 As a practical matter, however, the effect of interstate consolidation may not yet lead to 
significant bias. Jeon and Miller (2002b) report that most mergers and acquisitions still occur on 
an intrastate, rather than an interstate, basis. Interstate mergers jumped to about one-third of all 
mergers in both 1997 and 1998 at around 200 interstate mergers per year out of a total of 600 
mergers per year (Jeon and Miller 2002b, Table 1). Viewed differently, Jeon and Miller (2002b, 
Table 1) also report 11,055 mergers from 1976 to 1998, of which 614 involved interstate mergers 
and almost two-thirds (399) of these occurred in 1997 and 1998. 
 In sum, our measures reflect some bias after 1994.7 Thus, we perform our analysis for the 
full sample from 1976 to 2000 and from 1976 to 1994. The two analyses provide similar 
findings. We report that results from the longer sample, indicating where the results differed 
between the two samples. 
Profit-Structure Relationships 
The profit-structure relationship has received considerable attention in the industrial organization 
and banking literatures. Typically, a positive correlation emerges between profitability and 
concentration or market share. Berger (1995) argues that two competing theories can explain 
such positive correlations – market power and efficient structure theories. 
 The market-power theory includes two hypotheses – the traditional structure-conduct-
performance and the relative-market power hypotheses. The structure-conduct-performance 
 
6 Stiroh and Strahan (2002) make a similar argument and do not extend their analysis beyond 1994. 
7 If the measurement of concentration exhibits a random bias, then the regressions of profit onto concentration and 
other independent variables biases the estimated coefficient on concentration toward zero, making it harder to find 
  9
                                                                                                                                                                                          
hypothesis argues that more concentrated markets lead to higher loan rates and lower deposit 
rates because of lessened competition where as the relative-market power hypothesis argues that 
only large banks with some “brand identification” can influence pricing and raise profits. The 
difference between those two hypotheses revolves around whether market power proves generic 
to a market or specific to individual banks within a market. 
 The efficient-structure theory also includes two hypotheses – the X-efficiency and scale-
efficiency hypotheses. The X-efficiency hypothesis argues that banks with better managements 
and practices control costs and raise profit, moving the bank closer to the best-practice, lower-
bound cost curve. The scale-efficiency hypothesis argues some banks achieve better scale of 
operation and, thus, lower costs. Lower costs lead to higher profit and faster growth for the 
scale-efficient banks. 
 Berger (1995) claims that most prior tests of the market-power theories produce suspect 
findings, since they as a rule do not control for the efficient-structure theories. He provides a 
simultaneous test of all four competing hypotheses – two market-power and two efficient-
structure – by adding measures of X-efficiency and scale efficiency to the standard tests. He 
finds support for only two of the four hypotheses – the relative-market-power and the X-
efficiency hypotheses. His evidence does not support the structure-conduct-performance and 
scale-efficiency hypotheses.8 
 To implement his joint test, Berger (1995) uses individual bank balance sheet and income 
statement data to estimate a frontier cost function from which he derives the X-efficiency and 
 
significant effects. That we generally find significant effects strengthens our findings. 
8 Finding a significant effect for the X-efficiency, but not the scale-efficiency, hypothesis proves consistent with the 
empirical observation that X-efficiencies explains much more of differences in banks costs than do scale-
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scale-efficiency measures for each bank over the 1980 to 1989 period. In addition, the relative-
market-power hypothesis employs each bank’s market share. In sum, the joint test employs three 
bank-specific variables – market share, X-efficiency, and scale efficiency – and one generic 
market variable – concentration.  
 As noted above, our analysis considers the state as the “relevant market” and uses 
aggregate return on equity for all banks in a state as the profit (performance) measure. That is, 
we do not employ individual bank data.9 As a result, it appears that our analysis is subject to 
Berger’s (1995) criticism of market power-performance tests. That is, we do not control for the 
two efficient-structure hypotheses. We do argue, however, that our measures of concentration 
capture the structure-conduct-performance and relative-market-power hypotheses. That is, the 
fraction of total assets in a state held by the top-5 and top-10 banks captures to some extent how 
the largest banks affect statewide return on equity – the relative-market–power hypothesis -- 
while the Herfindahl-Hirschman index uses all banks to generate a measure of statewide 
concentration. 
 How do we address the absence of variables to control for the efficient-structure 
hypotheses? Here, we argue that our second set of panel-data, temporal-causality regressions 
differentiate between the market-power and efficient-structure theories. The market-power 
theory implies that market power comes first followed by higher profits. That is, market power 
allows banks to manipulate prices, thus leading to higher profit. The efficient-structure theory 
implies that better managements and practices lead to higher profits and that better performances 
 
efficiencies (Berger, Hunter, and Timme 1993). 
9 Note that the return on equity at the state level easily rewrites as the weighted average of each bank’s return on 
equity, where the weight equals the bank’s share of statewide equity. 
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then lead to rising market share and concentration. In sum, the temporal causality tests 
differentiate between the market-power and efficient-structure theories. 
4. Data, Hypotheses, and Regressions 
We use the Report on Condition and Income (Call Report) data posted at the website of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.10 We calculate the number of banks in each state, the average 
return on equity in each state, and our measures of concentration – the percent of assets held by 
the top-5 and top-10 banks (top5 and top10) as well as the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of 
concentration (HHI) in each state and the District of Columbia for 1976 to 2000.11 The data for 
the annual state level unemployment data come from the Bureau of Labor Statistics web site.12 
 Our maintained hypotheses are (1) that rising concentration in a state associates 
positively with and leads temporally the average rate of return on equity in that state; and (2) that 
an improved state economy, proxied by the state unemployment rate, associates positively with 
the average rate of return on equity in a state. As such, the market-power theory dominates the 
efficient-structure theory in explaining the observed data. We first perform panel regressions, 
using both fixed- and random-effect specifications, for the rate of return on equity as a function 
of the three measures of banking concentration separately. Then we add the number of banks to 
see if the absolute number of banks may affect the relationship between bank concentration and 
bank profitability (performance). Finally, we add the state unemployment rate, both with and 
 
10 The web address is http://www.chicagofed.org/economicresearchanddata/data/bhcdatabase/bhcdatabase.cfm. 
11 The return on equity is measured as net income divided by equity and is calculated from the Call Report codes as 
{(RIAD4000 – RIAD4130)/RCFD3210}. We also run regressions (not shown, but available on request) involving 
total income to equity (RIAD4000/RCFD3210) and total expenses to equity (RIAD4130/RCFD3210). We refer to 
those additional regressions when appropriate in the text. 
12 The web address is http://stats.bls.gov. 
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without the total number of banks. Tables 1, 2, and 3 report the findings for the top-5, top-10, 
and Herfindahl-Hirschman measures of concentration, respectively. 
 Several consistent findings emerge. First, in all specifications, higher concentration 
associates with a higher rate of return on equity within a state. That is, increasing concentration 
of bank assets goes along with higher bank profitability. Moreover, that finding is robust to 
whether we include other control variables such as the state unemployment rate. Second, as 
expected, a higher unemployment rate associates with a lower rate of return on equity (lower 
bank profitability). That is, a healthy economy correlates with healthier bank performance 
(profitability). Third, little evidence suggests that the number of banks within a state 
significantly correlates with the rate of return on equity over and above the effects of the 
concentration measures and the unemployment rate.13 
We noted in the introduction that one view of the consolidation process in the banking 
industry suggests that it is by and large a positive event  -- banks became more efficient 
(Jayaratne and Strahan, 1997, 1998). By that, Jayaratne and Strahan (1997, 1998) mean that 
customers receive better treatment after deregulation than before. Our tests do not directly 
compare to their tests, unless a rigid relationship exists between deregulation and market 
concentration. To provide further information about our findings, we also run regressions of the 
total income to equity and total expense to equity ratios, the component parts of our return on 
equity measure of bank performance.  
 
13 Similar findings emerge for the regressions that stop in 1994. We note, however, that the magnitude of the effects 
of the top-5 and top-10 measures of concentration in the full sample generally exceed those of the shorter sample. 
The results for the Herfindahl-Hirschman measure of concentration uniformly exhibit a smaller effect for the longer 
sample. In sum, the big mergers occur more frequently after 1994 suggesting that the top-5 and top-10 measures of 
concentration should have a larger effect for the longer sample and vice-versa for the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
measure. See Tables 1A, 2A, and 3A in the Appendix. 
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Several important observations emerge.14 First, all the findings support the positive 
relationship between concentration and return on equity. When income and expense ratios both 
fall (rise), the expense (income) ratio falls (rises) by a larger magnitude. 
Second, for the full sample period, the expense-to-equity ratio generally falls more than 
the income-to-equity ratio. Sometimes the effect of concentration on income to equity is not 
significant. Those results incorporate the 1995 to 2000 period and Jayaratne and Strahan (1997, 
1998) discuss similar findings on loan rates responding to deregulation. Most importantly, when 
we add unemployment and number of banks to the regressions, then the results experience a 
consistent shift whereby income to equity now increases with concentration and expenses to 
income do not change. These later results also match the findings in the shorter sample. 
Third, for shorter sample, the income to equity ratio generally rises more than the 
expense to equity ratio when concentration rises. Frequently, the expense to income ratio does 
not prove significant. Moreover, as we add unemployment and the number of banks to the 
regressions, the size and significance of the effect of concentration on the income-to-equity and 
expense-to-equity ratios generally gets larger and stronger. 
 Finally, since our interpretation of the relationship between bank profits and 
concentration relies on the market-power, rather than the efficient-structure, theories, we perform 
temporal causality tests between the average bank return on equity and our measures of 
concentration. 15 Table 4 reports the findings of bivariate vector autoregressions with three lags 
 
14 While not reported, those results are available from the authors. 
15 Although typically applied in a time-series setting, a few researchers adopt Granger causality in a panel-data 
setting. Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1988, 1989) provide a good theoretical foundation while Nair-Reichert 
and Weinhold (2001), Podrecca and Carmeci (2001), and Jeon and Miller (2002a) report useful applications. 
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of each independent variable. We perform tests of short-run temporal causality (i.e., the 
coefficients jointly equal zero) and long-run temporal causality (i.e., the sum of the coefficients 
equals zero). We find strong evidence that our measures of state-level bank concentration 
temporally lead the average return on equity in that state for all specifications in both the short 
and long run. In addition, we find little evidence that the state average return on equity for banks 
temporally leads our measures of bank concentration in that state in the short or long run. In 
sum, the evidence supports our hypothesis that increasing bank concentration leads the 
appearance of improved bank profitability and not that higher bank profitability first contributed 
to increased merger activity and then to increased concentration. 
 Such temporal causality tests, however, may reflect spurious correlation due to an 
omitted variable. That is, a third event, an improving economy during the 1990s, for example, 
may explain the movement in bank profitability that does not relate to the changes in bank 
concentration. To test that possibility, Table 5 reports the findings of temporal causality tests 
from trivariate vector autoregressions that include return on equity, the unemployment rate, and 
one of our measures of bank concentration. The basic findings continue to hold. That is, 
measures of concentration significantly cause return on equity in the short and long run, except 
for the Herfindahl-Hirschman index that no longer proves significant. Moreover, the 
unemployment rate also significantly causes return on equity (not shown), although that effect 
only occurs in the short run. In other words, the unemployment rate does not cause the return on 
equity in the long run. Further, the return on equity does not significantly cause the concentration 
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measures in the short or long run. In addition, the unemployment rate does not significantly 
cause concentration in the short or long run (not shown).16 
5. Conclusion 
 
Banking structure in the U.S. underwent significant change over the past two decades. Much of 
that activity was initiated by competition within the banking industry. That competition added 
pressure to the process of deregulation that occurred over the last two decades, culminating with 
the Interstate Banking and Branching Act of 1994. 
 We examined the evidence, if any, of the relationship between several measures of bank 
concentration at the state level and the average performance of banks within that state. We find a 
robust positive correlation between bank concentration in a state and the average return on 
equity within that state. Moreover, the linkage appears to run from increasing bank concentration 
to increasing bank profitability, and not the reverse. Those observations imply that the market-
power, rather than the efficient-structure, hypotheses holds for the U.S. banking industry during 
the last quarter of the 20th century. Thus, bank regulators need to monitor the consolidation 
process within the banking industry to head off the accumulation of monopoly power.  
 
 
16 Similar findings emerge from the sample that excludes 1995 to 2000. The one exception is that evidence of two-
way temporal causality occurs for the Herfindahl-Hirschman measure of concentration, especially in the short-run 
test. See Tables 4A and 5A in the Appendix. 
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Table 1: Concentration and Profitability: Top-5 Banks Share of Total Assets 
 Fixed-Effect Models 
 
Random-Effect Models 
Constant 7.0592* 
(6.28) 
9.6601* 
(5.48) 
17.9942* 
(11.13) 
17.7875* 
(9.19) 
9.2954* 
(7.32) 
10.5518* 
(6.25) 
20.2791* 
(12.87) 
20.0779* 
(11.00) 
Top5  0.2848* 
(13.21) 
0.2643* 
(10.99) 
0.2157* 
(9.72) 
0.2174* 
(9.10) 
0.2411* 
(12.67) 
0.2303* 
(10.77) 
0.1834* 
(9.76) 
0.1854* 
(8.95) 
Number of 
Banks 
 -0.0059 
(-1.91) 
 0.0006 
(0.19) 
 -0.0027 
(-1.16) 
 0.0004 
(0.20) 
Unemployment 
Rate 
  -1.1957* 
(-9.15) 
-1.2019* 
(-8.93) 
  -1.2979* 
(-10.34) 
-1.3006* 
(-10.27) 
R2-within 
R2-between 
R2-overall 
0.1249 
0.1086 
0.0904 
0.1275 
0.1155 
0.0915 
0.1810 
0.1983 
0.1749 
0.1810 
0.1970 
0.1747 
0.1249 
0.1086 
0.0904 
0.1269 
0.1137 
0.0920 
0.1796 
0.2192 
0.1873 
0.1797 
0.2176 
0.1868 
Note: The dependent variable is the average rate of return on equity (ROE) in percent in each 
state for 1976 to 2000. The numbers in parenthesis are t-statistics. Top5 is the percent of 
assets held by the largest five banks. Regressions possess 1275 observations – 51 states 
and the District of Columbia for 25 years (1976 to 2000).  
 
* means statistically significant at the 1% level  
** means statistically significant at the 5% level 
 
 
Table 2: Concentration and Profitability: Top-10 Banks Share of Total Assets 
 Fixed-Effect Models 
 
Random-Effect Models 
Constant 2.4085 
(1.63) 
3.8366 
(1.68) 
14.6116
* 
(7.32) 
13.3147* 
(5.40) 
6.2352* 
(4.16) 
6.6240* 
(3.20) 
18.3120
* 
(10.12) 
17.3278
* 
(7.89) 
Top10  0.3134* 
(13.19) 
0.3015* 
(10.81) 
0.2319* 
(9.33) 
0.2432* 
(8.73) 
0.2510* 
(12.30) 
0.2478* 
(10.28) 
0.1849* 
(9.15) 
0.1942* 
(8.33) 
Number of  
Banks 
 -0.0026 
(-0.82) 
 0.0029 
(0.89) 
 -0.0007 
(-0.30) 
 0.0018 
(0.77) 
Unemployment 
Rate 
  -1.1644* 
(-8.76) 
-1.1882* 
(-8.77) 
  -1.2966* 
(-10.23) 
-1.3056* 
(-10.25) 
R2-within 
R2-between 
R2-overall 
0.1245 
0.0960 
0.0792 
0.1250 
0.0995 
0.0801 
0.1763 
0.1721 
0.1559 
0.1768 
0.1650 
0.1543 
0.1245 
0.0960 
0.0792 
0.1248 
0.0973 
0.0796 
0.1741 
0.1989 
0.1738 
0.1748 
0.1923 
0.1719 
Note: See Table 1. Top10 is the percent of assets held by the largest ten banks. 
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Table 3: Concentration and Profitability: Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
 Fixed-Effect Models 
 
Random-Effect Models 
Constant 16.2967* 
(33.51) 
20.1100* 
(20.02) 
25.4834* 
(24.77) 
26.4424* 
(22.13) 
16.6858* 
(18.83) 
18.7598* 
(16.52) 
25.9906* 
(21.89) 
26.6006* 
(20.48) 
HHI 0.0052* 
(12.31) 
0.0047* 
(10.71) 
0.0040* 
(9.46) 
0.0039* 
(8.96) 
0.0049* 
(12.43) 
0.0045* 
(10.89) 
0.0038* 
(9.97) 
0.0037* 
(9.24) 
Number of 
Banks 
 -0.0124* 
(-4.33) 
 -0.0046 
(-1.57) 
 -0.0064* 
(-2.98) 
 -0.0024 
(-1.18) 
Unemployment 
Rate 
  -1.2863* 
(-10.02) 
-1.2238* 
(-9.12) 
  -1.3330* 
(-10.73) 
-1.3071* 
(-10.37) 
R2-within 
R2-between 
R2-overall 
0.1102 
0.1505 
0.1137 
0.1236 
0.1375 
0.1015 
0.1778 
0.2746 
0.2107 
0.1795 
0.2599 
0.2033 
0.1102 
0.1505 
0.1137 
0.1212 
0.1498 
0.1115 
0.1776 
0.2816 
0.2135 
0.1788 
0.2800 
0.2130 
Note: See Table 1. HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of concentration. 
 
 
Table 4: Bivariate Temporal Causality Tests 
 Fixed-Effect Models 
 
Random-Effect Models 
 
 Short-Run 
F(3, 1065) 
Long-Run 
F(1, 1065) 
Short-Run 
χ2(3)) 
Long-Run 
χ2(1) 
Concentration Does Not Temporally Lead (Cause) Return on Equity 
 
Top5 ⇒ ROE 13.76* 35.76* 13.42* 9.98* 
Top10 ⇒ ROE 16.26* 44.53* 11.81* 8.52* 
HHI ⇒ ROE 4.55* 10.91* 9.22** 8.05* 
 
Return on Equity Does Not Temporally Lead (Cause) Concentration 
 
ROE ⇒ Top5 0.90 0.36 2.15 0.10 
ROE ⇒ Top10 1.13 0.41 3.14 0.22 
ROE ⇒ HHI 2.98** 0.46 6.22 0.02 
 
Note: See Tables 1, 2, and 3. The fixed- and random-effect model employ F- and χ2-
tests for temporal causality. The symbol ⇒ means temporally causes (leads). For 
example, Top5 ⇒ ROE tests whether the top-5 concentration ratio temporally 
causes (leads) the return on equity. The bivariate vector autoregressive system for 
ROE and one of the concentration measures includes three lags of each 
independent variable. 
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Table 5: Trivariate Temporal Causality Tests, including Unemployment Control 
 Fixed-Effect Models Random-Effect Models 
 
 Short-Run 
F(3, 1062) 
Long-Run 
F(1, 1062) 
Short-Run 
χ2(3) 
Long-Run 
χ2(1) 
Concentration Does Not Temporally Lead (Cause) Return on Equity 
 
Top5 ⇒ ROE 12.43* 32.19* 14.92* 11.58* 
Top10 ⇒ ROE 14.67* 39.79* 13.53* 9.98* 
HHI ⇒ ROE 3.86* 9.67* 10.07* 9.33* 
 
Return on Equity Does Not Temporally Lead (Cause) Concentration 
 
ROE ⇒ Top5 0.57 0.08 1.42 0.15 
ROE ⇒ Top10 0.69 0.23 2.21 0.46 
ROE ⇒ HHI 2.53 0.00 5.73 0.53 
 
Note: See Table 4. The trivariate vector autoregressive system for ROE, the 
unemployment rate, and one of the concentration measures includes three lags of 
each independent variable. 
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Appendix: 
 
Table A1: Concentration and Profitability: Top-5 Banks Share of Total Assets 
 Fixed-Effect Models 
 
Random-Effect Models 
Constant 7.4694* 
(4.55) 
11.8031* 
(4.53) 
16.7175
* 
(8.62) 
18.8313* 
(7.06) 
12.1905
* 
(9.128) 
13.2410
* 
(7.26) 
21.1695
* 
(13.30) 
21.6436
* 
(11.08) 
Top5  0.2642* 
(7.84) 
0.2301* 
(6.18) 
0.2395* 
(7.73) 
0.2220* 
(6.17) 
0.1662* 
(7.12) 
0.1567* 
(5.97) 
0.1546* 
(6.99) 
0.1502* 
(6.04) 
Number of 
Banks 
 -0.0094** 
(-2.14) 
 -0.0050 
(-1.15) 
 -0.0021 
(-0.89) 
 -0.0010 
(-0.45) 
Unemployment 
Rate 
  -1.2061* 
(-8.27) 
-1.1843* 
(-8.06) 
  -1.2956* 
(-8.99) 
-1.2559* 
(-8.95) 
R2-within 
R2-between 
R2-overall 
0.0628 
0.1106 
0.0589 
0.0675 
0.1082 
0.0566 
0.1289 
0.1801 
0.1202 
0.1292 
0.1767 
0.1162 
0.0628 
0.1106 
0.0589 
0.0655 
0.1131 
0.0598 
0.1226 
0.2111 
0.1407 
0.1230 
0.2124 
0.1410 
Note: The dependent variable is the average rate of return on equity (ROE) in percent in each 
state for 1976 to 1994. The numbers in parenthesis are t-statistics. Top5 is the percent of 
assets held by the largest five banks. Regressions possess 969 observations – 51 states 
and the District of Columbia for 19 years (1976 to 1994).  
 
* means statistically significant at the 1% level  
** means statistically significant at the 5% level 
 
 
Table A2: Concentration and Profitability: Top-10 Banks Share of Total Assets 
 Fixed-Effect Models 
 
Random-Effect Models 
Constant 3.8092 
(1.77) 
8.0821*
* 
(2.42) 
13.8107
* 
(5.68) 
15.1929* 
(4.71) 
10.9060
* 
(6.94) 
11.8111
* 
(5.30) 
20.1666
* 
(11.19) 
20.5462
* 
(8.87) 
Top10  0.2800* 
(7.66) 
0.2447* 
(5.81) 
0.2431* 
(6.82) 
0.2252* 
(5.51) 
0.1587* 
(6.64) 
0.1507* 
(5.34) 
0.1429* 
(6.30) 
0.1395* 
(5.23) 
Number of  
Banks 
 -0.0077 
(-1.58) 
 -0.0040 
(-0.89) 
 -0.0015 
(-0.62) 
 -0.007 
(-0.30) 
Unemployment 
Rate 
  -1.1741* 
(-7.99) 
-1.1602* 
(-7.85) 
  -1.2469* 
(-8.85) 
-1.2447* 
(-8.82) 
R2-within 
R2-between 
R2-overall 
0.0602 
0.0951 
0.0502 
0.0630 
0.0952 
0.0494 
0.1214 
0.1567 
0.1054 
0.1221 
0.1552 
0.1030 
0.0602 
0.0951 
0.0502 
0.0618 
0.0968 
0.0508 
0.1148 
0.1938 
0.1306 
0.1150 
0.1945 
0.1307 
Note: See Table A1. Top10 is the percent of assets held by the largest ten banks. 
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Table A3: Concentration and Profitability: Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index 
 Fixed-Effect Models 
 
Random-Effect Models 
Constant 13.2155
* 
(17.60) 
16.6888* 
(10.48) 
21.7417
* 
(17.73) 
23.3665* 
(13.48) 
15.3226
* 
(17.93) 
15.6973
* 
(12.98) 
23.9565
* 
(19.47) 
23.9038
* 
(16.54) 
HHI 0.0080* 
(9.82) 
0.0073* 
(8.60) 
0.0076* 
(9.70) 
0.0072* 
(8.84) 
0.0056* 
(9.35) 
0.0055* 
(8.44) 
0.0053* 
(9.43) 
0.0053* 
(8.70) 
Number of 
Banks 
 -
0.0102** 
(-2.47) 
 -0.0053 
(-1.33) 
 -0.0010 
(-0.48) 
 0.0001 
(0.04) 
Unemployment 
Rate 
  -1.2265* 
(-8.61) 
-1.1988* 
(-8.33) 
  -1.2595* 
(-9.18) 
-1.2594* 
(-9.16) 
R2-within 
R2-between 
R2-overall 
0.0951 
0.1869 
0.1011 
0.1011 
0.1656 
0.0892 
0.1628 
0.2589 
0.1649 
0.1644 
0.2446 
0.1550 
0.0951 
0.1869 
0.1011 
0.0967 
0.1864 
0.1008 
0.1576 
0.2814 
0.1803 
0.1577 
0.2811 
0.1802 
Note: See Table A1. HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschmann index of concentration. 
 
 
Table A4: Bivariate Temporal Causality Tests 
 Fixed-Effect Models 
 
Random-Effect Models 
 
 Short-Run 
F(3, 759) 
Long-Run 
F(1, 759) 
Short-Run 
χ2(3) 
Long-Run 
χ2(1) 
Concentration Does Not Temporally Lead (Cause) Return on Equity 
 
Top5 ⇒ ROE 11.02* 24.47* 15.99* 8.87* 
Top10 ⇒ ROE 12.07* 28.76* 11.74* 6.13** 
HHI ⇒ ROE 6.95* 18.39* 17.52* 13.79* 
 
Return on Equity Does Not Temporally Lead (Cause) Concentration 
 
ROE ⇒ Top5 0.80 0.66 2.19 0.74 
ROE ⇒ Top10 1.12 0.09 3.70 0.37 
ROE ⇒ HHI 3.93* 2.67 8.32** 4.08** 
 
Note: See Tables A1, A2, and A3. The fixed- and random-effect model employ F- and 
χ2-tests for temporal causality. The symbol ⇒ means temporally causes (leads). 
For example, Top5 ⇒ ROE tests whether the top-5 concentration ratio temporally 
causes (leads) the return on equity. The bivariate vector autoregressive system for 
ROE and one of the concentration measures includes three lags of each 
independent variable. 
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Table A5: Trivariate Temporal Causality Tests, including Unemployment Control 
 Fixed-Effect Models Random-Effect Models 
 
 Short-Run 
F(3, 756) 
Long-Run 
F(1, 756) 
Short-Run 
χ2(3) 
Long-Run 
χ2(1) 
Concentration Does Not Temporally Lead (Cause) Return on Equity 
 
Top5 ⇒ ROE 10.73* 22.87* 16.52* 9.55* 
Top10 ⇒ ROE 11.40* 25.74* 12.22* 6.67* 
HHI ⇒ ROE 7.09* 18.36* 18.10* 14.52* 
 
Return on Equity Does Not Temporally Lead (Cause) Concentration 
 
ROE ⇒ Top5 0.57 0.15 0.76 0.18 
ROE ⇒ Top10 0.75 0.02 1.62 0.03 
ROE ⇒ HHI 4.09* 1.37 9.03** 3.58 
 
Note: See Table A4. The trivariate vector autoregressive system for ROE, the 
unemployment rate, and one of the concentration measures includes three lags of 
each independent variable. 
 
